Dual Vote and Differential Abstention. A Study About the Electoral Behaviour in Catalonia

Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper No. 465

39 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2000

See all articles by Clara Riba

Clara Riba

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

Date Written: undated

Abstract

This article presents the results of an empirical study about the reasons of the systematic change in the electoral results in Catalonia according to the type of elections. The hypothesis, positively tested with data from the period 1982-1993, is that the victory of the nationalist centre-right party in the autonomous elections in a region where always wins the socialist party in general elections, is due to the combination of the dual vote and differential abstention phenomena. The rational choice methodological approach allow to construct groups of electors with different perceptions about the space in which the political race takes place, fact that induces them different electoral behaviour. In combining these results with those obtained from the analysis with aggregated social and structural data, it is defined a certain profile of the dual voters and the differential non-voters. Finally, it is given an interpretation of the Catalan election results in 1995 and 1999 using as a clue the results of this study.

Keywords: Electoral Behaviour, Regional Elections, Spain, Catalonia, Dual Vote, Differential Abstention

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Riba Romeva, Clara, Dual Vote and Differential Abstention. A Study About the Electoral Behaviour in Catalonia (undated). Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper No. 465, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=235458 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.235458

Clara Riba Romeva (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(34-93) 542 27 13 (Phone)
(34-93) 542 17 46 (Fax)

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