Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces

44 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2013

Date Written: December 20, 2013

Abstract

Classical power index analysis considers the individual's ability to influence the aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either "yes" or "no." Here we generalize three important power indices to continuous convex policy spaces. This allows the analysis of a collection of economic problems like e.g. tax rates or spending that otherwise would not be covered in binary models.

Keywords: power, single peaked preferences, convex policy space, group decision making, Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, nucleolus, simple games, multiple levels of approval

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Kurz, Sascha, Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces (December 20, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2370399 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2370399

Sascha Kurz (Contact Author)

University of Bayreuth ( email )

Universitätsstr. 30
Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsmathematik
Bayreuth, Bavaria D-95440
Germany
+49 921 55 7353 (Phone)
+49 921 55 7352 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wm.uni-bayreuth.de/index.php?id=sascha

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