'The Employees are All Equal...But Some are More Equal than Others': Altruism, Opportunism and Discrimination in Family SMEs

Advances in Business-Related Scientific Research Conference 2014 Proceedings

13 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2013

See all articles by Filippo Ferrari

Filippo Ferrari

Bologna University; School of Psychology and Education

Date Written: December 20, 2013

Abstract

This article provides empirical evidence to support the Agency Theory as applied to small and medium-sized family firms. The research, conducted on a sample of SMEs (N=88), has investigated the main elements of the Agency Theory ( type of contract, agent autonomy, mechanisms of resource distribution, the match between job assignment and worker skills, the overall level of perceived organizational justice), using a qualitative method.

The literature suggests that altruism of the Principal as a parent and widespread opportunistic behavior by the Agent are confirmed phenomena typical of family SMEs. In addition, the research highlights the implications in terms of agency costs and perceived organizational justice on the part of employees who are not members of the family. Finally, this article suggests the causes and reasons for such altruistic and opportunistic behavior.

Keywords: Family Business, Agency Theory, Organizational justice, Opportunistic Behavior

Suggested Citation

Ferrari, Filippo, 'The Employees are All Equal...But Some are More Equal than Others': Altruism, Opportunism and Discrimination in Family SMEs (December 20, 2013). Advances in Business-Related Scientific Research Conference 2014 Proceedings, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2370584

Filippo Ferrari (Contact Author)

Bologna University ( email )

Bologna, 40123
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.unibo.it/docenti/filippo.ferrari5

School of Psychology and Education ( email )

Via Filippo Re, 6
Bologna, 40125
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.unibo.it/docenti/filippo.ferrari5

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