Local Employer Competition and Training of Workers

20 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2014

See all articles by Sylvi Rzepka

Sylvi Rzepka

Rhine-Westphalia Institute for Economic Research (RWI-Essen)

Marcus Tamm

RWI

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Abstract

The new training literature suggests that in a monopsonistic market employers will not only pay for firm-specific training but also for general training if the risk of poaching is limited. This implies that training participation should decrease when competition for employees is higher among firms. Using worker level data for Germany we find that the hypothesis is supported empirically. Specifically, we find that employees are significantly less likely to participate in training if the density of firms in a sector is higher within the local labor market.

Keywords: training, local labor markets, monopsony

JEL Classification: I24, J24, J42

Suggested Citation

Rzepka, Sylvi and Tamm, Marcus, Local Employer Competition and Training of Workers. IZA Discussion Paper No. 7853, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2374634 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2374634

Sylvi Rzepka (Contact Author)

Rhine-Westphalia Institute for Economic Research (RWI-Essen) ( email )

Hohenzollernstr. 1-3
Essen, 45128
Germany

Marcus Tamm

RWI ( email )

Invalidenstr. 112
10115 Berlin
Germany
+49 30 202159818 (Phone)
+49 30 202159819 (Fax)

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