Optimizing Intersections

45 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2014

See all articles by Ruth Evers

Ruth Evers

KU Leuven - Department of Economics

Stef Proost

KU Leuven - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 1, 2013

Abstract

In this paper we optimize the regulation of an intersection of two routes connecting one origin-destination pair and study the effects of priority rules, traffic lights and tolls. We show that when the intersection is regulated by a priority rule the optimal policy is generally to block one of the two routes. When the intersection is regulated by traffic lights, it can only be optimal to leave both routes open when both routes are subject to congestion or if a toll is levied.

Keywords: Stackelberg game, road pricing, signal setting, priority rule

Suggested Citation

Evers, Ruth and Proost, Stef V., Optimizing Intersections (October 1, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2381530 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2381530

Ruth Evers (Contact Author)

KU Leuven - Department of Economics ( email )

Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Stef V. Proost

KU Leuven - Department of Economics ( email )

Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
016 32 66 35 (Phone)
016 32 67 96 (Fax)

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