Creative Destruction and Development: Institutions, Crises, and Restructuring

42 Pages Posted: 14 Aug 2000

See all articles by Ricardo J. Caballero

Ricardo J. Caballero

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Mohamad L. Hammour

Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2000

Abstract

There is increasing empirical evidence that creative destruction, driven by experimentation and the adoption of new products and processes when investment is sunk, is a core mechanism of development. Obstacles to this process are likely to be obstacles to the progress in standards of living. Generically, underdeveloped and politicized institutions are a major impediment to a well-functioning creative destruction process, and result in sluggish creation, technological "sclerosis," and spurious reallocation. Those ills reflect the macroeconomic consequences of contracting failures in the presence of sunk investments. Recurrent crises are another major obstacles to creative destruction. The common inference that increased liquidations during crises result in increased restructuring is unwarranted. Indications are, to the contrary, that crises freeze the restructuring process and that this is associated with the tight financial-market conditions that follow. This productivity cost of recessions adds to the traditional costs of resource under-utilization.

JEL Classification: E0, J3, O1, O3, O4

Suggested Citation

Caballero, Ricardo J. and Hammour, Mohamad L., Creative Destruction and Development: Institutions, Crises, and Restructuring (August 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=238248 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.238248

Ricardo J. Caballero (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Mohamad L. Hammour

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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