The Relationship between Patenting Motives and Pendency Durations

36 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 2014

See all articles by Florian Jell

Florian Jell

Technische Universität München (TUM)

Joachim Henkel

TUM School of Management - Technical University of Munich (TUM)

Karin Hoisl

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; Munich School of Management, Ludwig-Maximilians-University; Copenhagen Business School, Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics

Date Written: October 31, 2013

Abstract

One of the most neglected aspects of strategic patenting behavior is the timing of the pre-examination phase. While an expeditious grant is often desirable, applicants may also benefit from a prolonged period of pre-examination pendency to create uncertainty or to otherwise improve their position in the competition. We build on work on strategic patenting behavior, and analyze whether the different strategic motives of applicants to file patent applications determine the duration of patent pendency. To do so, we exploit a distinctive feature of the German patent system, i.e. deferred examination. We base our analysis on original survey data on 186 German inventions. These data are matched with comprehensive register information on patents filed at the GPTO, which provides unique information to explore our topic. We find that motives related to gaining time to make decisions, increase pendency periods. Motives that require legal certainty affect pendency timing negatively. Our data also provide initial evidence that motives which rely on a broad scope of patent protection tend to delay lapse decisions. Our study has implications for managers, policy makers, and scholars.

Keywords: patents, pendency, strategic patenting

JEL Classification: O34, L20, M20

Suggested Citation

Jell, Florian and Henkel, Joachim and Hoisl, Karin, The Relationship between Patenting Motives and Pendency Durations (October 31, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2406536 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2406536

Florian Jell

Technische Universität München (TUM) ( email )

Arcisstrasse 21
Munich, DE 80333
Germany

Joachim Henkel (Contact Author)

TUM School of Management - Technical University of Munich (TUM) ( email )

Arcisstr. 21
Munich, D-80333
Germany

Karin Hoisl

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Munich School of Management, Ludwig-Maximilians-University ( email )

Kaulbachstraße 45
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.inno-tec.de/mitarbeiter/hoisl/index_e.html

Copenhagen Business School, Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics ( email )

Solbjerg Plads 3
Frederiksberg C, DK - 2000
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://www.cbs.dk/en/research/departments-and-centres/department-of-innovation-and-organizational-ec

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