Japanese Cartel Control in Transition

CEU San Pablo University Madrid, Working Paper No. 47/2014 (Competition Policy Series)

40 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2014

See all articles by Mel Marquis

Mel Marquis

Monash University Law School

Tadashi Shiraishi

University of Tokyo - Graduate Schools for Law and Politics

Date Written: December 18, 2013

Abstract

This paper has two main objectives. First, we explain the reasons for the renaissance in Japanese competition law enforcement, and second, we provide an overview of Japan’s anti-cartel regime. With regard to the first objective, in Part 1 of the paper we note the significance of the Strategic Impediment Initiative talks between Japan and the U.S. but we characterize those talks as a second-order factor, underlining instead the deeper issue of Japan’s stagnant economy. We observe that the old cultural assumption that economic recovery is possible without a genuine commitment to competitive markets and an effective competition policy has largely been overcome, and that this shifting economic ethos has enabled the JFTC to become a relatively more assertive enforcer. Additional factors highlighted include the leadership (2002-2012) of the former Chairman of the JFTC, and other influences such as the OECD’s evaluations of Japanese regulatory reform. As concerns the second objective of the paper, in Parts 2 and 3 we explain the basics of Japan’s anti-cartel regime. We review, inter alia, the rules on ‘substantial restraints on competition’ and the JFTC’s powers when it investigates and sanctions illegal conduct – either in cartel scenarios or, notoriously in Japan, bidrigging cases. Finally, in Part 4 we highlight recent developments such as the JFTC’s managerial transition under a new Chairman, and we briefly report on the amendments made to the Anti-Monopoly Act in December of 2013.

Keywords: Japan, Anti-Monopoly Act, cartels, bidrigging, antitrust, competition law, JFTC

Suggested Citation

Marquis, Mel and Shiraishi, Tadashi, Japanese Cartel Control in Transition (December 18, 2013). CEU San Pablo University Madrid, Working Paper No. 47/2014 (Competition Policy Series), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2407825 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2407825

Mel Marquis (Contact Author)

Monash University Law School ( email )

Wellington Road
Clayton, Victoria 3800
Australia

Tadashi Shiraishi

University of Tokyo - Graduate Schools for Law and Politics ( email )

7-3-1 Hongo Bunkyo-Ku
Tokyo, 113-0033
Japan
+81-3-5841-3127 (Phone)
+81-3-5841-3125 (Fax)

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