Ironies of Controlling State Crime

International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, Vol. 36, No. 3, Sept. 2008, pp. 196-210

16 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2014

See all articles by Jeffrey Ian Ross

Jeffrey Ian Ross

University of Baltimore - School of Law

Dawn L. Rothe

Old Dominion University

Date Written: September 1, 2008

Abstract

Control mechanisms and their effects are seldom analyzed in the subject matter of state crime.When what might be viewed as legitimate attempts to rectify a given situation occur, it happens all too often that well-intended individuals (i.e., advocates) and/or organizations can become additional victims of state crime. This truism has rarely been systematically reviewed. We aim to fill this gap by first identifying the government’s most typical reactions to attempts of control, including the process of legitimatizing the state’s efforts to frustrate the establishment of constraints on government agencies and actions. This paper examines the unintended consequences (i.e., things that they did not reasonably expect) that individuals and/or organizations may incur if and when they confront states that engage in criminal activity. The authors outline eight core reactions and then apply categories to recent actions by the US government in response to attempts of control against state criminality.

Keywords: state crime, control mechanisms, constraints on government agencies, constraints on government actions, unintended consequences, state criminality

JEL Classification: K14, K19, K42, K49, H89

Suggested Citation

Ross, Jeffrey Ian and Rothe, Dawn L., Ironies of Controlling State Crime (September 1, 2008). International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, Vol. 36, No. 3, Sept. 2008, pp. 196-210, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2425807

Jeffrey Ian Ross (Contact Author)

University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )

1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States

Dawn L. Rothe

Old Dominion University ( email )

Norfolk, VA 23529-0222
United States

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