Four Reasons for an Upper House: Representative Democracy, Public Deliberation, Legislative Outputs and Executive Accountability

42 Pages Posted: 5 May 2014

See all articles by Nicholas Aroney

Nicholas Aroney

The University of Queensland - T.C. Beirne School of Law; Emory University - Center for the Study of Law and Religion

Date Written: May 4, 2014

Abstract

Arguments for and against upper houses take many forms. The first objective of this article is to defend a classification of those arguments into four basic, but by no means mutually exclusive, lines of reasoning. These lines of reasoning, it is argued, are concerned respectively with (1) democratic representation, (2) public deliberation, (3) legislative outputs and (4) scrutiny of executive government. In describing and discussing these four lines of reasoning, the article also draws attention to the special role in the debate played by arguments from government efficiency and the separation of powers, and shows how these arguments operate against a backdrop of wider debates over the relative merits of parliamentary and presidential systems of government. The second objective of the article is to evaluate these lines of argument with a view to drawing some specific conclusions about the roles performed by upper houses within the Australian State political systems, especially noting proposals for their reform or abolition.

Keywords: upper house, second chamber, bicameralism, separation of powers

Suggested Citation

Aroney, Nicholas, Four Reasons for an Upper House: Representative Democracy, Public Deliberation, Legislative Outputs and Executive Accountability (May 4, 2014). Adelaide Law Review, Vol. 29, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2432755

Nicholas Aroney (Contact Author)

The University of Queensland - T.C. Beirne School of Law ( email )

Brisbane 4072, Queensland
Australia
+61-(0)7-3365 3053 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://law.uq.edu.au/profile/1098/nicholas-aroney

Emory University - Center for the Study of Law and Religion ( email )

Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

HOME PAGE: http://cslr.law.emory.edu/people/senior-fellows/aroney-nicholas.html

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
417
Abstract Views
1,942
Rank
129,923
PlumX Metrics