Credit Default Swaps and Corporate Cash Holdings

50 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2014 Last revised: 10 Jan 2015

See all articles by Marti G. Subrahmanyam

Marti G. Subrahmanyam

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Dragon Yongjun Tang

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics

Sarah Qian Wang

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School

Date Written: June 9, 2014

Abstract

We examine the effects of credit default swaps (CDS), a major type of over-the-counter derivative, on the corporate liquidity management of the reference firms. CDS help firms to access the credit market since the lenders can hedge their credit risk more easily using these contracts. However, CDS-protected creditors can be tougher in debt renegotiations and less willing to support distressed borrowers, causing some firms to become more cautious. Consequently, we find that firms hold significantly more cash after the inception of CDS trading on their debt. The increase in cash holdings by CDS firms is more pronounced for financially constrained firms and firms facing higher refinancing risk. Moreover, bank relationships and outstanding credit facilities intensify the CDS effect on cash holding. Finally, firms with greater financial expertise hold more cash when their debt is referenced by CDS. These findings suggest that CDS, which are primarily a risk management tool for lenders, induce firms to adopt more conservative liquidity policies.

Suggested Citation

Subrahmanyam, Marti G. and Tang, Dragon Yongjun and Wang, Sarah Qian, Credit Default Swaps and Corporate Cash Holdings (June 9, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447946 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2447946

Marti G. Subrahmanyam

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

Dragon Yongjun Tang

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

KKL 1004
Pokfulam Road
Pokfulam
Hong Kong
(852)22194321 (Phone)

Sarah Qian Wang (Contact Author)

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

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