Selective Reporting of Factual Content by Commercial Media

Journal of Marketing Research, Forthcoming

52 Pages Posted: 28 Jun 2014 Last revised: 13 Jul 2014

See all articles by Yi Zhu

Yi Zhu

University of Minnesota - Carlson School of Management

Anthony J. Dukes

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Date Written: June 25, 2014

Abstract

We study the market for factual content and ask whether competition increases or decreases its provision. Factual content is supplied by commercial media who observe a set of facts depicting the true state of the world and selectively decide how to report them. Consumers value content that matches their opinion, which gives media an incentive to slant their reports by omitting certain facts. The novel feature in our model is that consumers anticipate media’s incentives for slant and all stances taken by media must be supported by facts. Furthermore, reports with more facts are more convincing. Despite consumers ability to detect slant and demand for factual support, our results show that competition results in consumers reading fewer facts and unable to update their priors about the state. We also find that a monopoly medium may be more polarizing than competitive media, and a polarized reporting can be less biased.

Keywords: Factual Content, Media Bias, Media Competition, Information Goods, Cheap-Talk

Suggested Citation

Zhu, Yi and Dukes, Anthony J., Selective Reporting of Factual Content by Commercial Media (June 25, 2014). Journal of Marketing Research, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2459215

Yi Zhu (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Carlson School of Management ( email )

321 - 19th Ave. South, Suite 3-150
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

Anthony J. Dukes

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States
213-740-3846 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.usc.edu/anthonydukes/

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