The Structure of Debt and Active Equity Investors: The Case of the Buyout Specialist

Posted: 9 Apr 2001

See all articles by James F. Cotter

James F. Cotter

Wake Forest University School of Business

Sarah W. Peck

Marquette University - Department of Finance

Abstract

This paper examines the role buyout specialists play in structuring the debt used to finance the LBO and in monitoring management in the post-LBO firm. We find that when buyout specialists control the majority of the post-LBO equity, the LBO transaction is likely to be financed with less short-term and/or senior debt and less likely to experience financial distress. We also find that buyout specialists have greater board representation on smaller boards, suggesting that they actively monitor managers, and that for these transactions, using debt with tighter terms does not significantly increase the firm's performance. In contrast, in all other transactions using such debt does significantly increase the firm's performance. These findings suggest that active monitoring by a buyout specialist substitutes for tighter debt terms in monitoring and motivating managers of LBOs.

Keywords: Leveraged buyouts; Buyout specialists; Active investors; Financial distress; Debt structure

JEL Classification: G32, G33, G34

Suggested Citation

Cotter, James F. and Peck, Sarah W., The Structure of Debt and Active Equity Investors: The Case of the Buyout Specialist. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=251890

James F. Cotter

Wake Forest University School of Business ( email )

Farrell Hall 384
P.O. Box 7659
Winston-Salem, NC 27109-7659
United States
336-758-7220 (Phone)

Sarah W. Peck (Contact Author)

Marquette University - Department of Finance ( email )

College of Business Administration
P.O. Box 1881
Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881
United States
414-288-1461 (Phone)

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