On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly

Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N° 976

32 Pages Posted: 7 Nov 2014

See all articles by Luca Lambertini

Luca Lambertini

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 6, 2014

Abstract

This paper offers an overview of the literature discussing oligopoly games in which polluting emissions are generated by the supply of goods requiring a natural resource as an input. An analytical summary of the main features of the interplay between pollution and resource extraction is then given using a differential game based on the Cournot oligopoly model, in which (i) the bearings on resource preservation of Pigouvian tax rate tailored on emissions are singled out and (ii) the issue of the optimal number of firms in the commons is also addressed.

Keywords: pollution, commons, natural resources, green R&D, emission taxation, differential games

JEL Classification: C73, H23, L13, O31, Q52

Suggested Citation

Lambertini, Luca, On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly (November 6, 2014). Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N° 976, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2519988 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2519988

Luca Lambertini (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy
+39 051 2092600 (Phone)
+39 051 2092664 (Fax)

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