Step out -- Step in Sequencing Games

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2014-070

31 Pages Posted: 3 Dec 2014

See all articles by Marieke Musegaas

Marieke Musegaas

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER)

Peter Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Marieke Quant

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Date Written: December 2, 2014

Abstract

In this paper a new class of relaxed sequencing games is introduced: the class of Step out -- Step in sequencing games. In this relaxation any player within a coalition is allowed to step out from his position in the processing order and to step in at any position later in the processing order. Providing an upper bound on the values of the coalitions we show that every Step out -- Step in sequencing game has a non-empty core. This upper bound is a sufficient condition for a sequencing game to have a non-empty core. Moreover, this paper provides a polynomial time algorithm to determine the coalitional values of Step out -- Step in sequencing games.

Keywords: cooperative game theory, sequencing games, core

JEL Classification: C71, C44

Suggested Citation

Musegaas, Marieke and Borm, Peter E. M. and Quant, Marieke, Step out -- Step in Sequencing Games (December 2, 2014). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2014-070, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2533004 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2533004

Marieke Musegaas (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Peter E. M. Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Marieke Quant

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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