The Incentive for Working Hard: Explaining Hours Worked Differences in the U.S. And Germany

31 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2000 Last revised: 3 Jul 2022

See all articles by Linda A. Bell

Linda A. Bell

Haverford College - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Richard B. Freeman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies; Harvard University; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Date Written: December 2000

Abstract

This paper seeks to explain the greater hours worked by Americans compared to Germans in terms of forward-looking labor supply responses to differences in earnings inequality between the countries. We argue that workers choose current hours of work to gain promotions and advance in the distribution of earnings. Since US earnings are more unequally distributed than German earnings, the same extra work pays off more in the US, generating more hours worked. Supporting this inequality-hours hypothesis, we show that in both countries hours worked is positively related to earnings inequality in cross section occupational contrasts and that hours worked raises future wages and promotion prospects in longitudinal data.

Suggested Citation

Bell, Linda and Freeman, Richard B., The Incentive for Working Hard: Explaining Hours Worked Differences in the U.S. And Germany (December 2000). NBER Working Paper No. w8051, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=254012

Linda Bell (Contact Author)

Haverford College - Department of Economics ( email )

Haverford, PA 19041
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Germany

Richard B. Freeman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies ( email )

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Harvard University ( email )

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London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

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