Download This PaperSeller Beware: Supply and Demand Reduction and Price Manipulation in Multiple-Unit Uniform Price Auctions
93 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2015
Date Written: February 20, 2015
Abstract
We experimentally compare under-revelation of supply and demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending two-sided price clock auctions. We find that buyers reduce demand more when the price is ascending but sellers’ behavior is consistent across clock directions. As a result, the clock price rule has empirical effects on efficiency even though it is theoretically neutral.
Keywords: Demand Reduction, Supply Reduction, Uniform Price Auctions, Clock Auctions
JEL Classification: D02, D44
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Winn, Abel and Parente, Michael and Porter, David, Seller Beware: Supply and Demand Reduction and Price Manipulation in Multiple-Unit Uniform Price Auctions (February 20, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2560064 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2560064
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.