Recalibrating Bank Criminal Investigations and Supervisory Oversight after the Financial Crisis: A Comparison between the U.S. and the E.U.

Criminal Law Bulletin, Forthcoming

37 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2015

See all articles by Giulia Lasagni

Giulia Lasagni

University of Bologna, Students

Date Written: July 26, 2014

Abstract

After the financial crisis of 2006-2007, a lot has been said in the U.S. as well as in Europe, about the main reasons that led to one of the most tragic global economy depressions of the century.

In the management of such a context, the efficiency of administrative bank oversight and banking criminal investigations gained a primary position, due to banks’ increasing role in all the financial markets worldwide.

This Essay will analyze the U.S. system resulting from the Dodd-Frank Act, comparing it with the reforms in progress in the European Union, characterized by increasing supervisory powers of the European Central Bank. The Essay asserts that the effort taken so far in both countries are only partially able to satisfy the goals set, due to the permanence of some structural problems, such as the uncoordinated overlapping of multiple supervisory agencies and the dependency of the funding systems to the same subjects the agency has to control.

The analysis will apply a comparative approach, taking into account the U.S. and the E.U. main features concerning criminal investigations and supervisory oversight on financial institutions, as well as the minimum standards recommended at international level.

Keywords: Bank, financial crisis, grand jury, supervision, oversight, criminal investigations, EU, ECB, overlapping investigation, patriot act

Suggested Citation

Lasagni, Giulia, Recalibrating Bank Criminal Investigations and Supervisory Oversight after the Financial Crisis: A Comparison between the U.S. and the E.U. (July 26, 2014). Criminal Law Bulletin, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2570771

Giulia Lasagni (Contact Author)

University of Bologna, Students ( email )

Bologna
Italy

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