Curbing Systemic Risk in the Insurance Sector: A Mission Impossible?

The British Accounting Review 49 (2017) 256-273

37 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2015 Last revised: 25 May 2018

See all articles by Paola Bongini

Paola Bongini

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca

Laura Nieri

University of Genova - Department of Economics

Matteo M. Pelagatti

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS)

Andrea Piccini

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca

Date Written: September 1, 2014

Abstract

This paper addresses the issue of systemic risk in insurance and investigates how financial markets evaluate the introduction of a new regulation addressed to global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs). We analysed the stock price reactions and the evolution of the distance-to-default of a sample of 44 of the world's largest insurers to the publication of the first list of 9 G-SIIs and the release of information regarding their new capital requirements and other policy measures. The results of our event study suggest that, overall, investors doubt the effectiveness of the new regulatory framework in reducing systemic risk in the insurance sector and curbing the moral hazard implications of a “too systemic to fail” policy

Keywords: systemic risk; insurance companies; event study; regulatory reforms; loss absorbency requirements

JEL Classification: G01; G14; G22; G28

Suggested Citation

Bongini, Paola and Nieri, Laura and Pelagatti, Matteo M. and Piccini, Andrea, Curbing Systemic Risk in the Insurance Sector: A Mission Impossible? (September 1, 2014). The British Accounting Review 49 (2017) 256-273, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2572660 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2572660

Paola Bongini (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca ( email )

piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo 1
Milano, 20126
Italy
+39 0264483012 (Phone)

Laura Nieri

University of Genova - Department of Economics ( email )

via Vivaldi, 5
Genova, GE 16126
Italy

Matteo M. Pelagatti

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

Andrea Piccini

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, Milan 20126
Italy

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
139
Abstract Views
1,303
Rank
377,863
PlumX Metrics