Download This PaperPublic Goods in Networks: Some Results
20 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 2015
Date Written: March 8, 2015
Abstract
This paper introduces a new mechanism through which positive externality spills over in a network. We find that the introduction of the new spillover mechanism plays a major role in reducing the set of Nash equilibrium though at the same time it increases the set of stable equilibria in a network game with local positive externality. Furthermore, we show that a denser network do not necessarily give rise to higher welfare.
Keywords: Innovation, Network, Maximal independent set, Nash tatonnement, Welfare
JEL Classification: D83, D85, H41, O31
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ghosh, Papiya and Kundu, Rajendra Prasad, Public Goods in Networks: Some Results (March 8, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2575335 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2575335
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