Politics in the Courtroom: Political Ideology and Jury Decision Making

60 Pages Posted: 11 May 2015 Last revised: 12 Apr 2023

See all articles by Shamena Anwar

Shamena Anwar

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management

Patrick J. Bayer

Duke University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Randi Hjalmarsson

University of Gothenburg

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2015

Abstract

This paper uses data from the Gothenburg District Court in Sweden and a research design that exploits the random assignment of politically appointed jurors (termed nämndemän) to make three contributions to the literature on jury decision-making: (i) an assessment of whether systematic biases exist in the Swedish nämndemän system, (ii) causal evidence on the impact of juror political party on verdicts, and (iii) an empirical examination of the role of peer effects in jury decision-making. The results reveal a number of systematic biases: convictions for young defendants and those with distinctly Arabic sounding names increase substantially when they are randomly assigned jurors from the far-right (nationalist) Swedish Democrat party, while convictions in cases with a female victim increase markedly when they are assigned jurors from the far-left (feminist) Vänster party. The results also indicate the presence of peer effects, with jurors from both the far-left and far-right parties drawing the votes of their more centrist peers towards their positions. Peer effects take the form of both sway effects, where jurors influence the opinions of their closest peers in a way that can impact trial outcomes, and dissent aversion, where jurors switch non-pivotal votes so that the decision is unanimous.

Suggested Citation

Anwar, Shamena and Bayer, Patrick J. and Hjalmarsson, Randi, Politics in the Courtroom: Political Ideology and Jury Decision Making (May 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w21145, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2604826

Shamena Anwar (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Patrick J. Bayer

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Randi Hjalmarsson

University of Gothenburg ( email )

Box 640
Vasagatan 1, E-building, floor 5 & 6
Göteborg, 40530
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://economics.handels.gu.se/english/staff/professors/randi-hjalmarsson

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