Unintended Negative Consequences of Rewards for Student Attendance: Results from a Field Experiment in Indian Classrooms

26 Pages Posted: 19 May 2015

See all articles by Melody Manchi Chao

Melody Manchi Chao

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST)

Rajeev H. Dehejia

New York University (NYU) - Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); CESifo

Anirban Mukhopadhyay

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST)

Sujata Visaria

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST); City University London - Bayes Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 21, 2015

Abstract

In an experiment in non-formal schools in Indian slums, an incentive for attending a target number of school days increased average attendance when the incentive was in place, but had heterogeneous effects after it was removed. Among students with high baseline attendance, the post-incentive attendance returned to previous levels and test scores were unaffected. Among students with low baseline attendance, post-incentive attendance dropped even below previous levels, and test scores decreased. These students also reported lower interest in school material and lower expectations of themselves. Thus incentives might have unintended negative consequences in the long term for the very students they are most expected to help.

Keywords: educational economics, incentives, attendance, motivation, experiment

JEL Classification: I21, I28, O53

Suggested Citation

Chao, Melody Manchi and Dehejia, Rajeev H. and Mukhopadhyay, Anirban and Visaria, Sujata, Unintended Negative Consequences of Rewards for Student Attendance: Results from a Field Experiment in Indian Classrooms (April 21, 2015). HKUST IEMS Working Paper No. 2015-22, NYU Wagner Research Paper No. 2607789, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2607789 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2607789

Melody Manchi Chao

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) ( email )

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Rajeev H. Dehejia

New York University (NYU) - Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service ( email )

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Anirban Mukhopadhyay

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) ( email )

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Sujata Visaria (Contact Author)

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) ( email )

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City University London - Bayes Business School ( email )

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