Welfare Rules, Incentives, and Family Structure

60 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2015 Last revised: 30 Jan 2023

See all articles by Robert A. Moffitt

Robert A. Moffitt

Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Brian J. Phelan

DePaul University

Anne E. Winkler

University of Missouri at Saint Louis - Department of Economics

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Date Written: June 2015

Abstract

We provide a new examination of the incentive effects of welfare rules on family structure among low-income women by emphasizing that the eligibility and benefit rules in the AFDC and TANF programs are based more on the biological relationship between the children and any male in the household than on marriage or cohabitation per se. Using data from 1996 through 2008, we analyze the effects of 1990s welfare reforms on family structure categories that incorporate the biological status of the male. Like past work, we find that most policies did not affect family structure. However, we do find that several work-related reforms increased single parenthood and decreased marriage to biological fathers. These results are especially evident when multiple work-related policies were implemented together and when we examine the longer term impacts of the policies. We posit that these effects of work-related welfare policies on family structure stem from their effects on increased labor force participation and earnings of single mothers combined with factors special to biological fathers, including a decline in their employment and wages.

Suggested Citation

Moffitt, Robert and Phelan, Brian J. and Winkler, Anne E., Welfare Rules, Incentives, and Family Structure (June 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w21257, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2618645

Robert Moffitt (Contact Author)

Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics ( email )

Baltimore, MD 21218-2685
United States
410-516-7611 (Phone)
410-516-7600 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Brian J. Phelan

DePaul University ( email )

Anne E. Winkler

University of Missouri at Saint Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

8001 Natural Bridge Road
St Louis, MO 63121
United States

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