On the Properties of Linear Supply Functions in Oligopoly
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N° 1014
8 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2015
Date Written: June 18, 2015
Abstract
In this note we revisit the result by Menezes and Quiggin (2012), showing that under linear supply function competition, the same Nash equilibrium results when firms choose slopes or intercepts of their supply functions. This is because the first order conditions emerging in the two strategy spaces are not linearly independent.
Keywords: supply function, linear independence
JEL Classification: D43, L13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Delbono, Flavio and Lambertini, Luca, On the Properties of Linear Supply Functions in Oligopoly (June 18, 2015). Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N° 1014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2620649 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2620649
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