The Positive Effects of Nationwide Testing on Student Achievement in a Low-Stakes System

40 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2015 Last revised: 10 Jul 2016

See all articles by Simon Calmar Andersen

Simon Calmar Andersen

Department of Political Science and TrygFondens Centre for Child Research

Helena Skyt Nielsen

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: July 9, 2016

Abstract

This article examines the implementation of a set of compulsory IT-based, self-scored, and adaptive nationwide tests in a low-stakes accountability system. We exploit exogenous variation resulting from students voluntarily retaking the nationwide test after the IT system was down for ten days. We find beneficial effects of testing across the student population. Disadvantaged schools were more likely to (re)take the test despite the crash, and their students gained more from being tested. Our results indicate that the core component in accountability systems, i.e. student testing, is beneficial even without the high stakes that are part of many accountability systems.

Keywords: School accountability; academic performance; evaluation culture; test environment

JEL Classification: I21

Suggested Citation

Andersen, Simon Calmar and Nielsen, Helena Skyt, The Positive Effects of Nationwide Testing on Student Achievement in a Low-Stakes System (July 9, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2628809 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2628809

Simon Calmar Andersen

Department of Political Science and TrygFondens Centre for Child Research ( email )

Bartholins alle 7
Aarhus, 8000
Denmark

Helena Skyt Nielsen (Contact Author)

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business Economics ( email )

Fuglesangs Alle 4
Aarhus, 8210
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://person.au.dk/hnielsen@econ.au.dk

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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