Regulatory Adaptations for Delivering Information: The Case of Confession

Evolution and Human Behavior. Volume 36, Issue 1, Pages 44-51, 2015

Posted: 19 Aug 2015

See all articles by Daniel Sznycer

Daniel Sznycer

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Center for Evolutionary Psychology

Eric Schniter

Center for the Study of Human Nature - CSUF; Chapman University - George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics - Economic Science Institute

John Tooby

University of California, Santa Barbara - Center for Evolutionary Psychology

Leda Cosmides

University of California, Santa Barbara - Center for Evolutionary Psychology

Date Written: January , 2015

Abstract

Prior to, or concurrent with, the encoding of concepts into speech, the individual faces decisions about whether, what, when, how, and with whom to communicate. Compared to the existing wealth of linguistic knowledge however, we know little of the mechanisms that govern the delivery and accrual of information. Here we focus on a fundamental issue of communication: The decision whether to deliver information. Specifically, we study spontaneous confession to a victim. Given the costs of social devaluation, offenders are hypothesized to refrain from confessing unless the expected benefits of confession (e.g. enabling the victim to remedially modify their course of action) outweigh its marginal costs — the victim’s reaction, discounted by the likelihood that information about the offense has not leaked. The logic of welfare tradeoffs indicates that the victim’s reaction will be less severe and, therefore, less costly to the offender, with decreases in the cost of the offense to the victim and, counter-intuitively, with increases in the benefit of the offense to the offender. Data from naturalistic offenses and experimental studies supported these predictions. Offenders are more willing to confess when the benefit of the offense to them is high, the cost to the victim is low, and the probability of information leakage is high. This suggests a conflict of interests between senders and receivers: Often, offenders are more willing to confess when confessions are less beneficial to the victims. An evolutionary-computational framework is a fruitful approach to understand the factors that regulate communication.

Keywords: Communication, Decision-making, Motivation, Welfare tradeoff ratio, Shame

JEL Classification: C72, DOO

Suggested Citation

Sznycer, Daniel and Schniter, Eric and Tooby, John and Cosmides, Leda, Regulatory Adaptations for Delivering Information: The Case of Confession (January , 2015). Evolution and Human Behavior. Volume 36, Issue 1, Pages 44-51, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2645963

Daniel Sznycer (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Center for Evolutionary Psychology ( email )

Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9660
United States

Eric Schniter

Center for the Study of Human Nature - CSUF ( email )

800 N. State College Blvd.
Fullerton, CA 92831-3599
United States

Chapman University - George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics - Economic Science Institute ( email )

1 University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/ericschniter/

John Tooby

University of California, Santa Barbara - Center for Evolutionary Psychology ( email )

Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9660
United States

Leda Cosmides

University of California, Santa Barbara - Center for Evolutionary Psychology ( email )

South Hall 5504
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States

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