Leadership and Persistency in Spontaneous Dishonesty

IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 10/2015

29 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2015

See all articles by Susanne Braun

Susanne Braun

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU); Durham Business School

Lars Hornuf

Technische Universität Dresden; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: October 13, 2015

Abstract

Extensive evidence shows that when given the opportunity, people cheat for monetary rewards, but only to the extent that they can keep a positive self-concept. In this study, we investigate various factors that may influence the degree to which people can keep their positive self-concept while cheating for monetary gains. We find that authentic leadership, gender, cheating norm, experience of cheating, and expectations of others’ cheating behavior have no effect on participants’ spontaneous dishonesty on an abstract task. Therefore, reducing people’s cheating behavior might be a long-term project for the management of fraudulent organizations and more difficult than might be expected.

Keywords: Cheating, dishonest behavior, authentic leadership, self-concept maintenance, organizations

JEL Classification: C92, J53, M5

Suggested Citation

Braun, Susanne and Hornuf, Lars, Leadership and Persistency in Spontaneous Dishonesty (October 13, 2015). IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 10/2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2674628 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2674628

Susanne Braun

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
Munich, DE Bavaria 80539
Germany

Durham Business School ( email )

Mill Hill Lane
Durham, Durham DH1 3LB
United Kingdom

Lars Hornuf (Contact Author)

Technische Universität Dresden ( email )

Dresden, 01307
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.hornuf.com

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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