Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of an Economy with Incomplete Information

26 Pages Posted: 2 May 2001

See all articles by Richard P. McLean

Richard P. McLean

Rutgers University - Department of Economics

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 3, 2001

Abstract

We examine the ex ante incentive compatible core, and show that generically, when agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (1999), the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty.

Keywords: core, incentive compatibility, general equilibrium, asymmetric information

JEL Classification: D5, D7

Suggested Citation

McLean, Richard P. and Postlewaite, Andrew, Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of an Economy with Incomplete Information (January 3, 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=267785 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.267785

Richard P. McLean

Rutgers University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Andrew Postlewaite (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

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