Internet Appendix for 'The Effect of CEO Departure on Target Firms’ Post-Takeover Performance: Evidence from Not-Delisting Target Firms'
7 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2015
Date Written: October 30, 2015
Abstract
This internet appendix provides additional results that complement the main results of the paper. In the first part, we show the results of the self-selection model that incorporates the observation that target firms may self-select not to delist from the stock markets after takeovers. In the second part, we employ a propensity score matching model to address the potential endogeneity between CEO turnover and subsequent firm performance.
The paper "The Effect of CEO Departure on Target Firms’ Post-Takeover Performance: Evidence from Not-Delisting Target Firms" to which these Appendices apply is available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2684064
Keywords: Corporate takeover, Acquisition performance, CEO turnover
JEL Classification: G14, G30, G34, M12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation