Download This PaperWhy Credit Ratings Serve a Greater Role in Emerging Economies than Industrial Nations: A Comparative Analysis between Family Firms and Concentrated Ownership Structures in South Asia
Financial Market Regulations and Legal Challenges in South Asia, IGI Global Amit K. Kashyap (Gujarat National Law University, India) and Anjani Singh Tomar (Gujarat National Law University, India), Projected Release Date: April, 2016. Copyright © 2016. 308 pages.
6 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2015 Last revised: 23 Mar 2016
Date Written: April 7, 2015
Abstract
The agency problem attributed to dispersed ownership is also principally regarded as being that of the control over powerful management. Whilst there are conflicting views in respect of the degree of agency problems which arise under dispersed and concentrated ownership structures, it appears that additional or greater agency problems will eventually necessitate the need for greater monitoring. In recommending the external auditor’s expertise as appropriate for addressing agency problems, this chapter draws attention to the audit committee’s roles, presenting them as being both as a vital and complementary as corporate governance tools.
Keywords: corporate governance, banking theory, risk, ownership structures, auditor, disclosure, principal, agent, regulation, moral hazard
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