The Governance of International Courts and Tribunals: Organizing and Guaranteeing Independence and Accountability - A Appeal for Research

Abstract

International courts and tribunals have by now become well-established institutions. Many books and articles have been published on the law and practice of, for example, the International Criminal Court, various international criminal tribunals - notably those for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda - the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, international administrative tribunals (dealing with complaints of staff of international organizations), regional courts in Europe, Africa and America (such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)). At the same time, significantly less research has been done into the law and practice of those international organs (‘governance institutions’) that carry out the necessary governance functions over all these international courts and tribunals. Examples of such organs are the Assembly of States Parties (the governance institution for the ICC), the Meeting of States Parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘SPLOS’, for ITLOS), the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO (for the WTO Appellate Body), the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (for the ECtHR). These governance institutions elect the judges of international courts and tribunals, adopt their budgets, supervise the implementation of judgments and take other decisions that are of fundamental importance for the way in which international courts and tribunals can carry out their judicial tasks independently. This paper is an appeal for more research into the law and practice of what I will call international judicial governance institutions (injugovins).

Keywords: international courts and tribunals; governance; judicial function; judicial independence; judicial accountability; judicial governance institutions