Economic Evidence in Regulatory Disputes: Revisiting the Court-Regulatory Agency Relationship in the US and the UK

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 565–594, 2016, DOPI: 10.1093/ojls/gqv035

50 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2016 Last revised: 19 Oct 2018

Date Written: December 9, 2015

Abstract

This article examines the issue of the appropriate scope of review of economic evidence enshrined in the discretionary assessments of utility regulators in the US and the UK. It advances a balance of institutional competencies approach to the question of the degree of deference owed to the regulatory agency’s economic assessments. In doing so, it revisits the doctrinal positions advanced in the US and the UK for the substantive review of administrative discretion, so as to become attuned to the challenges posed by economic evidence. Drawing on insights from political science and economics, the suggested approach illuminates the institutional disadvantages of the courts that may warrant a high degree of deference. At the same time, however, it remains sensitive to the polycentric elements of regulatory disputes as well as to a number of institutional realities that may attenuate the weight of such comparative institutional disadvantages.

Keywords: judicial review, adjudication, economic regulation, evidence, comparative law, administrative law

JEL Classification: A11, A12, K21, K23, K41, L43, L94, L96, L97

Suggested Citation

Mantzari, Despoina, Economic Evidence in Regulatory Disputes: Revisiting the Court-Regulatory Agency Relationship in the US and the UK (December 9, 2015). Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 565–594, 2016, DOPI: 10.1093/ojls/gqv035, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710116

Despoina Mantzari (Contact Author)

UCL Laws ( email )

Bentham House
London WC1H 0EG, London WC1
United Kingdom

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