The Use of Alternatives to Patents and Limits to Incentives

138 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2016

See all articles by Mark Rogers

Mark Rogers

University of Oxford, Harris Manchester College; Aston University - Aston Business School

Christian Helmers

Santa Clara University - Department of Economics

Bronwyn H. Hall

University of California at Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS); Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Vania Sena

University of Essex

Date Written: November 16, 2012

Abstract

One of the most puzzling findings in the empirical analysis of firms’ patenting behaviour is the low proportion of patenting firms in the population of registered companies. Also, there is evidence suggesting that firms may not patent all patentable inventions and that this behaviour differs across firms within industries and across industries as well. Our study takes a closer look at the use of patents and alternative Intellectual Property (IP) mechanisms by UK firms, and the impact of such use on firm performance.

We review the economic literature on the choice of IP protection, and then use a new and comprehensive dataset consisting of UK firms during the 1997-2006 period to examine the determinants and outcomes of the use of various IP protection mechanisms. The study is divided into four parts: a literature review, a descriptive analysis, a study of the strategic use of patents, and a multi-equation study of the relationship between IP choice, innovation and total factor productivity.

Suggested Citation

Rogers, Mark Llewellyn and Helmers, Christian and Hall, Bronwyn H. and Sena, Vania, The Use of Alternatives to Patents and Limits to Incentives (November 16, 2012). Intellectual Property Office Research Paper No. 2012/21, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710628 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2710628

Mark Llewellyn Rogers

University of Oxford, Harris Manchester College ( email )

Manor Road Building
Manor Road
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom

Aston University - Aston Business School ( email )

Aston Triangle
Birmingham, B47ET
United Kingdom

Christian Helmers

Santa Clara University - Department of Economics ( email )

500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States

Bronwyn H. Hall (Contact Author)

University of California at Berkeley ( email )

549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States

HOME PAGE: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/index.html

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

7 Ridgmount Street
London, WC1E 7AE
United Kingdom

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Vania Sena

University of Essex ( email )

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