Campaign Rhetoric: A Model of Reputation

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 525

36 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2001

See all articles by Enriqueta Aragones

Enriqueta Aragones

Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) - Insitute for Economic Analysis

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 21, 2000

Abstract

We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over what policy the candidate will implement in case he wins the election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaign promises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises are believed by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtain that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's reputation.

Keywords: Electoral campaigns, reputation, commitment.

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Aragonés, Enriqueta and Postlewaite, Andrew, Campaign Rhetoric: A Model of Reputation (September 21, 2000). UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 525, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=273410 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.273410

Enriqueta Aragonés (Contact Author)

Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) - Insitute for Economic Analysis ( email )

08193 Bellaterra
Spain
34-93-580-6612 (Phone)
34-93-580-1452 (Fax)

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7350 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~apostlew

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