Campaign Rhetoric: A Model of Reputation
UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 525
36 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2001
Date Written: September 21, 2000
Abstract
We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over what policy the candidate will implement in case he wins the election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaign promises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises are believed by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtain that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's reputation.
Keywords: Electoral campaigns, reputation, commitment.
JEL Classification: D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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