Environmental Markets

Environmental Decision Making (LeRoy C. Paddock, Robert L. Glicksman, & Nicholas S. Bryner, eds.) (Edward Elgar, Encyclopedia of Environmental Law series), 2016, Forthcoming

16 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2016

See all articles by Victor Byers Flatt

Victor Byers Flatt

Case Western Reserve University School of Law

Date Written: January 19, 2016

Abstract

Market-based (or economic incentive) control strategies have been used in a variety of environmental contexts for over 25 years. Due to political and economic theories, their use has been proliferating in more and more contexts. This chapter discusses the underlying theory of using markets or environmental incentives as a method for controlling environmental pollution or enhancing environmental amenities, substantive areas in which environmental markets are currently used or in which environmental markets can be expected, and concludes with a discussion of environmental protection, economic incentives, and markets that suggest when such schemes are useful and what limits exist to their use.

Keywords: Environmental markets, market-based control strategies, economic incentives, cap-and-trade, environmental trading systems, clean air act market-based trading systems, acid rain control strategies, Kyoto Protocol, wetlands banking, ecosystem services, ecosystem stacking, tragedy of the commons

JEL Classification: G13, G14, G18, H32, K11, K19, K20, K21, K23, K32, L10, Q20, Q24, Q25, Q26, Q28

Suggested Citation

Flatt, Victor Byers, Environmental Markets (January 19, 2016). Environmental Decision Making (LeRoy C. Paddock, Robert L. Glicksman, & Nicholas S. Bryner, eds.) (Edward Elgar, Encyclopedia of Environmental Law series), 2016, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2750021

Victor Byers Flatt (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University School of Law ( email )

11075 East Boulevard
Cleveland, OH 44106-7148
United States

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