Corporate Governance in Search of the Shareholder-Manager Balance of Power

Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business, Vol. 14:1, 2015

36 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2016

See all articles by Razeen Sappideen

Razeen Sappideen

Western Sydney University, School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 26, 2016

Abstract

Recent legislation intended to strengthen shareholder power over managers and the Board of Directors ("Board" or "Boards") through legislative measures such as say on pay, compensation clawbacks, and requiring Boards to submit themselves for re-election in the United States ("U.S."), United Kingdom ("U.K."), and Austra­lia has led to the strengthening of blockholder (i.e. investment funds, hedge funds, etc.) power over managers and the rest of the shareholder body. At the same time, these developments also enable managers to act opportunistically and protect their interests by being more accommodating to the demands of blockholders. The formation of such alli­ances between managers and blockholders can negatively impact the rest of the shareholder body and should therefore be brought to ac­ count. This article examines the causes and consequences of these developments, and ways of addressing the resulting issues.

Suggested Citation

Sappideen, Razeen, Corporate Governance in Search of the Shareholder-Manager Balance of Power (March 26, 2016). Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business, Vol. 14:1, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2755154

Razeen Sappideen (Contact Author)

Western Sydney University, School of Law ( email )

Locked Bag 1797
Penrith, NSW 2751
Australia

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