Intuitive Cooperation and Punishment in the Field

32 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2016

See all articles by Luis Artavia-Mora

Luis Artavia-Mora

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Institute of Social Studies (ISS)

Arjun S. Bedi

Erasmus University Rotterdam - International Institute of Social Studies; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Matthias Rieger

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Institute of Social Studies (ISS)

Abstract

We test whether humans are intuitively inclined to cooperate with or punish strangers using a natural field experiment. We exogenously vary the time available to help a stranger in an everyday situation. Our findings suggest that subjects intuitively tend to help but behave more selfishly as thinking time increases. We also present suggestive evidence that time pressure can increase rates of punishment. We discuss our results with respect to findings in the lab on cognitive models of dual-processing and the origins of human cooperation.

Keywords: cooperation, punishment, response time, dual-process of cognition, natural field experiment

JEL Classification: D03, D63, D64

Suggested Citation

Artavia-Mora, Luis and Bedi, Arjun S. and Rieger, Matthias, Intuitive Cooperation and Punishment in the Field. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9871, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2769179 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2769179

Luis Artavia-Mora (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Institute of Social Studies (ISS) ( email )

PO Box 29776
Den Haag, 2518 AX
Netherlands

Arjun S. Bedi

Erasmus University Rotterdam - International Institute of Social Studies ( email )

PO Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague, 2518 AX
Netherlands
+31 70 426 0493 (Phone)
+31 70 426 0799 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Matthias Rieger

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Institute of Social Studies (ISS)

PO Box 29776
Den Haag, 2518 AX
Netherlands

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