Money Laundering Regulation and Bank Compliance Costs. What Do Your Customers Know? Economics and Italian Experience

Forthcoming in Journal of Money Laundering Control

Posted: 3 Sep 2001

See all articles by Donato Masciandaro

Donato Masciandaro

Bocconi University - Department of Economics; Bocconi University - Department of Economics (ECO)

Umberto Filotto

University of Tor Vergata

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to point up the link between the effectiveness of the anti-laundering regulations and the characteristics of the relative compliance costs for banks, with particular attention to the bank - customer relationships. The work is organized as follows. The second section contains the economic framework, that starts with the assumption that intermediaries have an information advantage and then demonstrates, by means of a principal-agent model, how this advantage can produce collective advantages in the war against money laundering only if the regulations take the problem of compliance costs into due consideration.

Based on the economic results, then, section three presents an empirical part, comprising a survey conducted in conjunction with an Italian bank present in 11 of Italy's 20 regions, on how banks perceive the relationship of customers with the obligations imposed by the anti-laundering regulations. The survey provides a better understanding of the nature and extent of compliance costs within banking operations. Section four contains the concluding remarks.

Note: This is a description of the paper and not the actual abstract.

Keywords: Money laundering banks law

JEL Classification: G21, K40, O50

Suggested Citation

Masciandaro, Donato and Filotto, Umberto, Money Laundering Regulation and Bank Compliance Costs. What Do Your Customers Know? Economics and Italian Experience. Forthcoming in Journal of Money Laundering Control, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=279010

Donato Masciandaro (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Bocconi University - Department of Economics (ECO) ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Umberto Filotto

University of Tor Vergata ( email )

Via di Tor Vergata
Rome, Lazio
Italy

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