Credit Lines and the Liquidity Insurance Channel

42 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2016 Last revised: 23 Jun 2018

See all articles by Viral V. Acharya

Viral V. Acharya

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Heitor Almeida

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Filippo Ippolito

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Ander Perez-Orive

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Date Written: May 15, 2018

Abstract

We suggest a new mechanism–the liquidity insurance channel–based on the widespread reliance of high credit quality firms on bank credit lines for liquidity management. Our model matches the patterns of usage of loans and credit lines in the cross-section of firms, and defines the conditions under which shocks to bank health affect primarily low or high credit quality firms. Our framework can explain why credit line origination is more cyclical than loan origination. Overall, we uncover a novel interaction between bank health and economic activity through the provision of bank credit lines to high credit quality firms.

Keywords: liquidity management, cash holdings, liquidity risk, investment, lending channel, credit lines

JEL Classification: G21, G31, G32, E22, E5

Suggested Citation

Acharya, Viral V. and Acharya, Viral V. and Almeida, Heitor and Ippolito, Filippo and Ippolito, Filippo and Perez-Orive, Ander, Credit Lines and the Liquidity Insurance Channel (May 15, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795794 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2795794

Viral V. Acharya

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
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2129954256 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~vacharya

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Heitor Almeida

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

515 East Gregory Drive
4037 BIF
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-3332704 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.business.illinois.edu/FacultyProfile/faculty_profile.aspx?ID=11357

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Filippo Ippolito

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(+34) 93 542 2578 (Phone)
(+34) 93 542 1746 (Fax)

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Ander Perez-Orive (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

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