Pro-Cyclical Capital Regulation and Lending

48 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2016

See all articles by Markus Behn

Markus Behn

European Central Bank (ECB)

Rainer F. H. Haselmann

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Paul Wachtel

New York University - Stern School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

We use a quasi-experimental research design to examine the effect of model-based capital regulation introduced under the Basel II agreement on the pro-cyclicality of bank lending and firms' access to funds during a recession. In response to an exogenous shock to credit risk in the German economy, loans subject to modelbased, time-varying capital charges were reduced by 3.5 percent more than loans under the traditional approach to capital regulation. The effect is even stronger when we examine aggregate firm borrowing, suggesting that the pro-cyclical effect of model-based capital charges is not offset by substitution to other banks which use the traditional approach.

Keywords: capital regulation, credit crunch, financial crisis

JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Behn, Markus and Haselmann, Rainer F. H. and Wachtel, Paul, Pro-Cyclical Capital Regulation and Lending (2014). Bundesbank Discussion Paper No. 32/2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2797009 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2797009

Markus Behn (Contact Author)

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Rainer F. H. Haselmann

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Mertonstrasse 17-25
Frankfurt am Main, D-60325
Germany

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

(http://www.safe-frankfurt.de)
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Paul Wachtel

New York University - Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th St.
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-4030 (Phone)
212-995-4218 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~pwachtel

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