The Analytics of the Greek Crisis

74 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2016

See all articles by Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas

Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Thomas Philippon

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Dimitri Vayanos

London School of Economics; Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: June 2016

Abstract

We provide an empirical and theoretical analysis of the Greek Crisis of 2010. We first benchmark the crisis against all episodes of sudden stops, sovereign debt crises, and lending boom/busts in emerging and advanced economies since 1980. The decline in Greece's output, especially investment, is deeper and more persistent than in almost any crisis on record over that period. We then propose a stylized macro-finance model to understand what happened. We find that a severe macroeconomic adjustment was inevitable given the size of the fiscal imbalance; yet a sizable share of the crisis was also the consequence of the sudden stop that started in late 2009. Our model suggests that the size of the initial macro/financial imbalances can account for much of the depth of the crisis. When we simulate an emerging market sudden stop with initial debt levels (government, private, and external) of an advanced economy, we obtain a Greek crisis. Finally, in recent years, the lack of recovery appears driven by elevated levels of non-performing loans and strong price rigidities in product markets.

Keywords: bank-sovereign loop, DSGE model, fiscal contraction, Greek crisis, price rigidities, sovereign default, sudden stop

JEL Classification: E2, E3, E5, E6, F3, F4

Suggested Citation

Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier and Philippon, Thomas and Vayanos, Dimitri, The Analytics of the Greek Crisis (June 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11334, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2798123

Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/pgourinchas

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/pgourinchas

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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HOME PAGE: http://www.nber.org/people/pierre-olivier_gourinchas

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Thomas Philippon

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
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New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Dimitri Vayanos

London School of Economics ( email )

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London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7955 6382 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 7955 7420 (Fax)

Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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