An Online Appendix to 'Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search'

23 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2016 Last revised: 21 Apr 2018

See all articles by Bobby Kleinberg

Bobby Kleinberg

Microsoft Research New England

Bo Waggoner

Harvard University Department of Computer Science

E. Glen Weyl

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects; Plurality Institute; GETTING-Plurality Research Network

Date Written: April 13, 2018

Abstract

This online appendix accompanies the paper “Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search” by the same authors. The main paper is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2753858.

Keywords: Assignment auctions, matching, descending price, Dutch auction, information acquisition, search

JEL Classification: D44, D47, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Kleinberg, Robert and Waggoner, Bo and Weyl, Eric Glen, An Online Appendix to 'Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search' (April 13, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2810329 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2810329

Robert Kleinberg

Microsoft Research New England ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/~rdk/

Bo Waggoner

Harvard University Department of Computer Science ( email )

33 Oxford Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Eric Glen Weyl (Contact Author)

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects ( email )

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8579984513 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com

Plurality Institute ( email )

GETTING-Plurality Research Network ( email )

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Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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