The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Superadditive Coalitional Games

37 Pages Posted: 3 Sep 2001

See all articles by Glenn MacDonald

Glenn MacDonald

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School

Michael D. Ryall

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Date Written: August 2, 2001

Abstract

We explore the determinants of the payoffs an individual player may obtain in the equilibria of superadditive n-player coalitional games with transferable payoff. We provide conditions necessary and sufficient for the lower bound on a player's equilibrium payoff to coincide with his reservation payoff, and show that if this lower bound is strictly larger than the reservation payoff, then there is an implied condition whose obvious interpretation is in terms of competing groups of players. We also provide a parallel set of results on the upper bound.

Keywords: Core, Equilibrium, Coalitional games, Cooperative games

JEL Classification: C7

Suggested Citation

MacDonald, Glenn M. and Ryall, Michael D., The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Superadditive Coalitional Games (August 2, 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=281870 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.281870

Glenn M. MacDonald (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/macdonald/

Michael D. Ryall

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada