Allocation of the Commons: Parking and Stopping on the Commons

38 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2001

See all articles by Richard A. Epstein

Richard A. Epstein

New York University School of Law; Stanford University - Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: August 2001

Abstract

The economic forces governing transitions between different property rights regimes has been the source of extensive study since Demsetz's path breaking 1967 essay, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights." This paper offers first a general critique of that position, chiefly on the ground that it underestimates the practical difficulties of orchestrating efficient transitions in contexts where strong political forces are at play. Thereafter, the paper explores the movement among various systems that are used to allocate a particular public good, namely parking places on public streets. It examines both bottom-up systems that rely on analogues to the rule of first possession (in both clear and snowy weather) and top-down systems that use meters and permits as allocation devices. It offers explanations as to why the optimal rule will tend to vary with the density of traffic and generally opposes the use of special permits that limit occupancy to residences of certain neighborhoods, which effectively reduce the carrying capacity of a system of roads.

Keywords: Property rights, public lands, first possession, permits, parking

Suggested Citation

Epstein, Richard A., Allocation of the Commons: Parking and Stopping on the Commons (August 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=282512 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.282512

Richard A. Epstein (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
(212) 992-8858 (Phone)
(212) 995-4894 (Fax)

Stanford University - Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-9563 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
690
Abstract Views
4,120
Rank
69,436
PlumX Metrics