Evaluating the European View that the Us Has No Unemployment Problem

14 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 2004 Last revised: 2 Jan 2022

See all articles by Richard B. Freeman

Richard B. Freeman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies; Harvard University; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Date Written: April 1988

Abstract

This study contrasts the labor market performance of the U.S. and OECD Europe in the 1980s and critically evaluates the view that the U.S. has generated more jobs because its labor market is more 'flexible'. The study finds that the greater employment expansion in the U.S. was associated with slower growth of real wages and productivity than in most of OECD Europe rather than with relatively costless flexibility. It also finds that while some aspects of relative wage flexibility, for instance in youth versus adult wages, helped limit U.S. unemployment, other aspects, for instance regional wage, show no greater flexibility in the U.S. than in the U.K., where labor markets are allegedly less flexible. Finally, the study argues that the disparate experiences of the U.K., with a relatively decentralized labor market, and Sweden, with a centralized wage-setting system, show that decentralized labor markets are neither necessary nor sufficient for employment-enhancing wage settlements.

Suggested Citation

Freeman, Richard B., Evaluating the European View that the Us Has No Unemployment Problem (April 1988). NBER Working Paper No. w2562, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=283339

Richard B. Freeman (Contact Author)

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