A Weaved Up Folly?: Preference, Well-Being and Morality in Social Decision
45 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2001
Date Written: September 6, 2001
Abstract
This essay evaluates the strategy of incorporation often adopted in welfarist evaluation of legal rules and institutions. The strategy of incorporation includes every concern that motivates the agent within the agent's preference ordering. More specifically, this extended preference ordering encompasses her concerns arising from deontological constraints and consideration of justice. Pursuit of a strategy of incorporation presents two difficulties for an analyst committed to welfarist evaluation. First, the larger the set of reasons for actions incorporated within the agent's preference ordering, the more likely that satisfaction of the preference ordering cannot be equated with the agent's well-being. This failure to link preference and well-being may be problematic because welfarism apparently rests on the moral appeal of the promotion of well-being. Second, even if one regards these extended preferences as appropriate bases for moral evaluation, we would not aggregate them as welfarist directs. The strategy of incorporation ignores the distinction between "preference" (narrowly understood) and "judgment." The argument is developed with reference to the argument for welfarism recently advanced in Kaplow and Shavell, "Fairness vs. Weflare", 114 Harvard Law Review 961 (2001).
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