Tax Competition, the Distribution of Mne's Ownership and the Wage Formation Process
28 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2002
Date Written: January 2002
Abstract
This paper shows how the distribution of the ownership of multinational companies and the labour market conditions, especially the wage formation process, influence the outcome of interjurisdictional tax competition and coordination. In particular, it sets forth that equilibrium corporate tax rate can be negative, being a subsidy to the mobile factor, financed through a tax on the immobile one, and that foreign ownership of companies enables a jurisdiction which behaves non-cooperatively to export its tax burden through a too large tax rate on profits on its territory.
Keywords: Tax Competition, Tax Coordination, Multinational Firm, Foreign Ownership, Labour Market, Wage Formation
JEL Classification: H32, H73, H87
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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