Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation
38 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2002
Abstract
The challenge in the campaign contribution literature has been to overcome the simultaneous equation bias that is inherent in the vote-contribution relationship. This paper proposes a new method to overcome this bias. It examines behavior at different points of time and relates it to contributions at different points of time. This method is applied to legislators' voting decisions on financial services regulation. Analyzing this type of legislation is of particular interest because it allows an analysis of the net influence of competing interest group. Consistent with the proposed model's predictions I find evidence that changes in contribution levels determine changes in roll call voting behavior, that contributions from competing groups are partially offsetting, and that junior legislators are more responsive to changes in contribution levels than senior legislators.
Keywords: Campaign finance, campaign contributions, legislatures
JEL Classification: D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
The Political Economy of the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis
By Atif R. Mian, Amir Sufi, ...
-
The Political Economy of the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis
By Atif R. Mian, Amir Sufi, ...
-
A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures are Increasing: The Government is Getting Bigger
By John R. Lott
-
How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic Earmarks