Contemporaneous Perfect Epison Equilibria

15 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2002

See all articles by George J. Mailath

George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Research School of Economics, ANU

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Date Written: February 2002

Abstract

We examine contemporaneous perfect equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best response. This concept implies, but is not implied by Radner's ex ante perfect equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a game achieved by perturbing payoffs by at most e/2, with the converse holding for pure equilibria.

Keywords: Epsilon Equilibrium, Ex Ante Payoff, Multistage Game, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

JEL Classification: C70, C72, C73

Suggested Citation

Mailath, George J. and Postlewaite, Andrew and Samuelson, Larry, Contemporaneous Perfect Epison Equilibria (February 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=305894 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.305894

George J. Mailath (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7908 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://web.sas.upenn.edu/gmailath/

Research School of Economics, ANU ( email )

HW Arndt Building
College of Business and Economics
Canberra, ACT 2601
Australia

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7350 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~apostlew

Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

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