Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games

Posted: 15 May 2002

See all articles by Bernhard von Stengel

Bernhard von Stengel

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Mathematics

Antoon H. van den Elzen

Tilburg University, CentER

Dolf Talman

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Abstract

This paper presents an algorithm for computing an equilibrium of an extensive two-person game with perfect recall. The method is computationally efficient by virtue of using the sequence form, whose size is proportional to the size of the game tree. The equilibrium is traced on a piecewise linear path in the sequence form strategy space from an arbitrary starting vector. If the starting vector represents a pair of completely mixed strategies, then the equilibrium is normal form perfect. Computational experiments compare the sequence form and the reduced normal form, and show that only the sequence form is tractable for larger games.

Suggested Citation

von Stengel, Bernhard and van den Elzen, Antoon H. and Talman, Dolf J. J., Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=312255

Bernhard Von Stengel (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Mathematics ( email )

Houghton Street
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Antoon H. Van den Elzen

Tilburg University, CentER ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 3178 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3019 (Fax)

Dolf J. J. Talman

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2346 (Phone)

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